Also, how do you decide how much they pay to each owner who is enrolled in the PES program? Pay them all equal, or did you lay down payments based on the degree of threat to your country? (A higher threat level often means that the country is also more valuable.) And what do you think these payments depend on — the number of trees that stay standing? Water quality at the bottom of the watershed? The wildlife population in the countryside? Whatever you choose to commit payments, where does the money come from to monitor the impact of the program and who does that audit? Incentive-based mechanisms are aimed at suppliers with lower opportunity costs. Therefore, the potential for poverty reduction as a linked political objective depends in part on the coincidence between the cost of opportunity and poverty. For example, poorer farmers may tend to have peripheral areas with higher slopes and lower soil quality, with less opportunity to leave land in natural vegetation to increase the supply of ecosystem services. In this case, EPS systems have the potential to simultaneously make payments to the poor and the most cost-effective ecosystem service providers. In addition, it is essential that the pES policy be able to improve equity “15” and depend on the difference between landowners` income and the production of environmental benefits ( 15). If the country that produces a high level of service is owned by poor members of society, a PES approach can contribute to the fight against poverty by paying for the services they provide to these landowners. However, it is likely that pessimistic programs will only actually improve poverty outcomes if they pay landowners significantly more than they would otherwise have earned with the country.h This implies a likely trade-off between the cost-effectiveness of the program and poverty reduction.i A number of studies have achieved positive results for hydrological services. , but these have often been seen as improvements in water quality and quantity. results are not measured.
In addition, several researchers find that the links between forest cover and water quantity and quality are complex and poorly understood. These links also vary considerably from one type of forest to another. Similarly, in the policy areas of the pES, if the marginal environmental benefits of a given ecosystem service are not constant, simple PES systems that do not take into account how the benefits vary according to the different configurations of the participants may not have an environmental effect. Many examples of marginal benefits and non-constant threshold effects are found in ecological systems, including lakes, coral reefs, oceans, forests and dry areas (18, 19). For example, preserving the habitat of a large predator may require a minimum area for species viability; Below this level, conservation offers no protective benefits for this species. When a PES system simply compensates for the various land use changes without taking these irregularities into account, it cannot achieve its environmental objective. Several EPS systems have been developed (p. B. ref.
20 and 21) that take into account non-constant marginal benefits to avoid this problem.